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Abstract. 
This paper challenges the widely held view that sharply falling real transport costs closed 
the transatlantic gap in grain prices in the second half of the 19th century. Several new 
results emerge from an analysis of a new data set of weekly wheat prices and freight 
costs from New York to UK markets.  Firstly, there was a decline in the transatlantic 
price gap but it was not sharp and the gap remained substantial.  Secondly, the fall in the 
transatlantic price differential had more to do with improved market and marketing 
efficiency than with falling transport costs. Thirdly, spurious price convergence (or 
divergence) can appear if quality differences associated with allegedly homogeneous 
commodities like wheat are not controlled for. 
 
 
 
1.Introduction 
There is almost universal agreement that not only nominal but also real transatlantic transport 
costs and long-haul freight rates in general declined sharply  in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and caused international commodity price gaps to close. This line of 
research has engaged quite a few modern economic historians and is  aptly summed up in a 
recent monograph by Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, who conclude that they 
have ‘... documented an impressive increase in the extent of commodity market integration in  
the Atlantic economy as the late 19th century unfolded. Sharply declining transport costs 
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brought distant national markets much closer together than at any time before.1 O’Rourke and 
Williamson inferred falling transport costs from their analysis of international price-spreads of 
a number of commodities and they also used freight rate data constructed and published by C. 
Knick Harley. The analysis of price-spreads usually suggests an implausible extent of the  
decline in transport and transaction costs. K. O’Rourke, for example, in his exciting analysis 
of the effects of the grain invasion on European late 19th century trade policy uses numbers on 
price spreads such as a negative price differential relative to US wheat by wheat importing 
Denmark and a zero differential for UK, which depended heavily on US wheat.2 C.Knick 
Harley, as well as K. O’Rourke and J.G. Williamson, refer to persuasive graphical 
representations of  price spreads of US and English  wheat  which indicate that the 
transatlantic price gap had been practically eliminated by the end of the 19th century (Harley) 
or early 20th century  (O’Rourke and Williamson). It is suggested that a decline in price 
spreads indicates not only a sharp but approximately   actual decline in transport costs 
(O’Rourke and Williamson) and transport and marketing costs (Harley).3 This conclusion rests 
on an implicit assumption that the quality differential between, say, Chicago Spring No 2 and 
the English Gazette  average, is stable over time. It also assumes that the transport and 
transaction costs adjusted law of one price operated throughout the period, that is that markets 
were fairly efficient. An important conclusion from the present article is that transatlantic 
markets were not but became increasingly efficient over time, which contributed to the decline 
in price spreads. 
When we turn to actual freight  cost data we are on safer ground. Harley dates the decline in 
real transport costs to around 1850 and takes issue with Douglass C. North who suggested an 
almost permanent fall from the mid-18th century.  Harley’s conclusion was based on a new 
freight series constructed from British coastal freight rates for coal as well as Baltic (timber 
and grain), Mediterranean (grain) and Atlantic (timber) freights up to 1870. Like O’Rourke 
                                                 
1
 K.H.O’Rourke and J.G.Willliamson, Globalization and History, The Evolution of the 
Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy, Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press, 1999, p.55  
2
 K. H.O’Rourke,’The European Grain Invasion, 1870-1913’, Journal of Economic History, 
57, 1997, pp.775-801. 
3
  C.Knick Harley says that ‘the quite striking convergence of prices...resulted primarily from 
sharp declines in both ocean and overland transportation costs’ on the basis of  an analysis of 
Chicago (No.2 Spring) and British (Gazette) price convergence in the second half of the 19th 
century. Harley, however, explicitly introduces marketing costs and suggests that these costs 
also fell. See   C.Knick Harley, ‘Transportation, the World Wheat Trade, and the Kuznets Cy-
cle, 1850-1913, Explorations in Economic History, 17, 1980, pp.218-250.   
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and Williamson, Harley relies on L. Isserlis’ study4 for the post-1870 period.  This study is 
based on a large number of routes and goods, each of which is represented by the average of 
the yearly maximum and minimum rate. Harley converts the Isserlis data to s per ton of coal 
and deflate the series by the UK GNP deflator. K. O’ Rourke and J.G. Williamson suggest on 
the basis of the North’s, Isserlis and Harley’s data that  the decline in transatlantic transport 
costs amounts to between 41 to 70  per cent from the mid 19th century to WW1 decline,  the 
interval in the assessment  dependent on source and  time period.5   
This paper focuses on the role played by transport costs and other forces in the convergence of 
prices in the Atlantic economy during the second half of the 19th century. It challenges the 
presumptions that (a) changes in inter-market price spreads replicate changes in transport costs 
and that  (b) a decline in price spreads is a good guide in analysing the extent of market 
integration, and finally it   re-assesses (c) the extent of  price-convergence and the impact of 
transport costs therein.  
Price spreads are explained by transport costs, the extent of market efficiency and a rigorous 
analysis must control for quality differences in the goods compared, since quality price 
spreads are large and vary over time. The standard for judging market integration is the 
stability of the transport and transaction cost adjusted law of one price, rather than the law of 
one price in the literal sense of the word.6 I will determine the impact of transport costs 
relative to improved market performance for the recorded price convergence. I do this by 
presenting a newly compiled data set of weekly observations of US and UK wheat prices as 
recorded in New York and London commodity markets and transport costs of wheat from 
New York to British ports in the period 1850-1900. Freight rates for wheat are deflated by the 
price of wheat in New York. The reason for using wheat prices rather than a GDP deflator or 
some other price index as a deflator is straightforward.  Falling transport costs have been seen 
                                                 
4
 C.Knick Harley, ‘Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740-1913:The Primacy of 
Mechanical Invention Reaffirmed’,Journal of Economic History,Vol.48,1988, pp. 851-875; 
Douglass C.North, ‘Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development 1750-1913', Journal of 
Economic History, Vol 18, 1958, pp.537-55; L.Isserlis, ‘Tramp Shipping Cargoes, And 
Freights’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,Vol 101,1938, pp.53-146. 
5
 K.O’Rourke and J.G.Williamson, ‘When  did globalization begin?’, European Review of 
Economic History, 6,1,2002,pp.23-50. 
6
 M.Ejrnæs and K.G.Persson,’Market integration and Transport Costs in France 1825-1903:A 
Threshold Error Correction Approach to the Law of One Price,’ Explorations in Economic 
History,37, 2000, pp.149-73. 
 
4 
 
as the prime factor closing the price gap, as measured by, say, the UK wheat price expressed 
as a ratio to the US price. This number converges to unity, so the argument goes, because the 
transport cost expressed as proportion of US price falls. There is an obvious parallel to tariffs 
here because high transport costs are a sort of effective – though implicit – tariff expressed as 
a percentage of the price of the imported good. The important question arises whether a 
proportional fall in transatlantic transport costs added to the impact of tariff reductions on 
European farmers, thus making transport costs partly responsible for the return to 
protectionism in Continental Europe. Williamson and O’Rourke argue that the late 19th  and 
early 20th century transport costs  reductions were far more important than the spectacular 
decline in trade barriers in the second half of the 20th century, which witnessed a decline in 
average tariffs form 40 to 7 percent of value of goods, a 33 percentage point decline, but it 
‘…was smaller than the  45 percentage point fall in pre-1914 trade barriers due to transport 
improvements.’ An astonishing claim, which is difficult to reconcile with known facts. 7 
If - as demonstrated in this article - transport costs did some, but not a great deal, to close the 
price gap, then what explains the convergence?  The possibilities include port and dock 
charges in UK and marine insurance. These costs are too small a fraction of the price of wheat 
to have had a significant impact even if they were falling substantially. Therefore I focus on 
the decline of a residual price differential, which reveals increasing market efficiency as 
information density in markets improved with the telegraphic transmittance and printed press 
diffusion of information. The residual is that part of the price differential between, say, 
London and New York, that cannot be accounted for by transport costs, port charges, or 
marine insurance. The existence of that residual, it is suggested, was partly due to market 
imperfections. It reveals un-exploited profit opportunities or monopoly rents captured by 
traders, which could block the entry of competitors into the trade. A plausible conjecture is 
that risk-averse traders demanded a considerable margin due to the risks associated with the 
slow transmission of information and the associated volatility of prices. When traders became 
better informed with the advent of the telegraph and proliferation of the commercial press it  
was easier to assess risk and they no longer permitted profitable opportunities to remain 
unexploited, so the residual declined. Hidden costs, such as those associated with marketing 
and organisation of the grain trade might also turn up in the residual. Increased competition 
                                                 
7
  K.O’Rourke and J.G.Williamson, ‘When  did globalization begin?’, European Review of 
Economic History, 6,1,2002,pp.23-50. The quote is from p.37.     
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linked to greater transparency might foster efficiency and will imply a fall in the residual. It 
will be demonstrated empirically that the decline in the residual is the major factor bringing 
about transatlantic price convergence in the last half of the 19th century.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 an accounting framework for the analysis of 
price spreads is developed and in sections 3 to 6 the elements of that accounting formula are 
documented. We will first look at transport costs in section 3, then move to port and dock 
charges in section 4 and marine insurance premiums in section 5.  In section 6 we determine 
the relative strength of the forces behind the observed price convergence. Section 7 concludes. 
The data set is presented in the Appendix. 
 
2.The determinants of international price gaps: an accounting framework.   
Let us consider a uni-directional trade pattern, with US exporting wheat to UK in a free trade 
regime and with prices in New York quoted exclusive of transport and insurance cost to UK. 
The price differential is given by the identity below: 
 
(1) P English wheat,London - PUS wheat,New York   = TRANS +  INS+ PC + QUAL English wheat - US wheat   + 
RES 
 
where P is price,  TRANS are transport costs, INS is the insurance premium, PC are port 
charges  in the exporting and importing harbours and QUAL is the price premium reflecting 
the quality difference between the reference wheat quality (‘English’ and ‘US’ in identity (1)) 
negotiated in London (English wheat) and New York (US wheat) respectively. RES, finally is 
a non-recorded residual indicating any arbitrage risk premium for traders working in poorly 
informed and uncertain environments, any profit captured by merchants exploiting exclusive 
information and, finally, un-identified (marketing) costs. QUAL is either negative, positive or 
zero depending on the qualities compared while TRANS, INS and PC are strictly positive. 
RES should be positive but converging to zero as market efficiency improves. If all 
unidentified costs have been accounted for and RES = 0 the transport and transaction cost 
adjusted law of one price rules. There are historical records documenting P, TRANS, INS and 
PC although only P and TRANS data are available on a frequent basis. Historical records help 
to solve (1) leaving the sum of RES + QUAL. However, I am particularly concerned with 
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getting an estimate of RES since the hypothesis is that RES has fallen considerably in the 
period when the density and speed of information had a positive impact on market efficiency.  
QUAL is a non-trivial entity - price differences can be as high as 15 to 35 per cent between 
qualities in a single market - and can therefore seriously bias estimates of price spreads. 
However a great many studies ignore these potential effects  
 
In the framework of identity (1) above it is clear that a zero price differential as reported in 
both cases cited above must reflect a negative quality premium on ‘English Gazette’ wheat 
indicating its inferior quality. Quality premiums vary a lot over time due to harvest conditions 
and broad aggregates like ‘Gazette’ wheat are likely to change composition over time, making 
it unsuitable for long-term analysis of price spreads if the quality premium is not controlled. 
Thorstein Veblen pointed out long ago that well-defined grades also changed in relative price 
terms because milling technology innovations could make better use of previously underrated 
qualities. That is why hard spring wheat were catching up on winter wheat in US markets  by 
the end of the 19th century.8 
It is possible to estimate QUAL, however by solving  (2)  
 
(2) QUAL English wheat - US wheat = P English wheat, London  - P US wheat, London  
 
Price differentials between different grades of wheat in one single market must reflect quality 
differences as revealed by consumer preferences. A priori we do not expect quality premia to 
be stable in the short run. Differences in weather conditions at different locations will affect 
quality in the short run, and for US wheat conditions in transit to Europe may be an additional 
hazard. However, it turns out that even if we look at well-defined qualities of wheat we do not 
find a stable long run relationship. 
 
                                                 
8
 T. Veblen distrusted the use of aggregates such as the English Gazette price: ’Gazette 
averages are useless for any exact comparison.’ See his ‘The Food Supply and the Price of 
Wheat’, Journal of Political Economy ,1, 1893, pp.365-379. 
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Figure 1 shows the price of English White relative to US grown American Red in 1878-1896, 
both negotiated at London’s Mark Lane market. The data reveal a considerable variation in 
relative prices with fairly long transitory deviations with a length up to 50 weeks and as large 
as 25 to 30 percent from peak to trough, reflecting quality impact of harvest outcomes. There 
is also a drift in relative prices suggesting the possibility of quality reversals, or changing  
consumer preferences. The nature of the drift in relative prices differs by qualities but the 
magnitude of the variation is about the same and is present also for earlier periods. Suffice it to 
say that using different qualities can be seriously misleading and lead to spurious convergence 
or divergence results. However, there is a simple way of evading the quality problem in price 
spread accounting: simply substitute (2) for QUAL in (1), cancel terms, and  (1) can be 
expressed as 
 
 (1') P US wheat,London - P US wheat, New York  =  TRANS  +  PC + INS + RES 
 
The solution is to use a strictly identical quality in both markets, rather than two qualities and 
two markets. P in equation (1') can be represented by, say, (US) Red Winter traded in London 
and US Red Winter traded in New York. That is the procedure chosen in this paper. 
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3. Relative transport costs 
It is preferable to present the expressions in the accounting formula discussed above in relative 
terms, so henceforward they will be expressed as a proportion of the New York price. We look 
first at proportional transport costs, defined as the cost of freight from New York to Liverpool 
or London, and expressed in the US local price, represented by the New York price of Red 
Western, later Red Winter (no.2). These are depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
It is clear from Figure 2 that relative costs varied much but without displaying a strong 
downward trend. In fact the series does  easily  lend itself neither to linear trend analysis nor to 
meaningful statements in  terms of a yearly percentage decline in real transport costs. There 
are two relatively short periods - 1861-64 and 1875-79 - with exceptionally high transport 
costs but for the rest of the period, that is for about 80 per cent of the years covered, relative 
costs were between five to ten per cent of New York wheat price. In the periods before, 
between and after the spells of  high  prices fluctuations  are stationary around a constant level, 
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although there is a decline in the levels over time. The extent of that decline is documented in  
Table 1 with data on overlapping decadal freight rates and the table confirms the visual 
impression. That table presents two estimates of relative transport costs. The left hand column 
is based on New York to Liverpool freight rates between 1852 and 1877 and from then on for 
New York to London as in Figure 2. Since freight rates to London  were slightly higher - on 
average by 12 per cent – the right hand column has been adjusted by a multiple of 1.12 for the 
period 1852-1877. The results relating to adjusted relative transport costs suggest a fall from 
the first and last period of Table 1 of  23 per cent. If you calculate the decline from the 1850s 
to the two last decades, that is 1881 to 1900 the decline is slightly higher at 31 per cent. It is 
worth pointing out that the decline in percentage points  is within one standard deviation – 
between four and five percent – recorded in the early periods. By contrast nominal freight 
rates (see Appendix Figure 1) decline significantly from the mid 1870s but so do wheat prices, 
as shown in Appendix Figure 2. 9 
 
 
Table 1. Average relative transport cost in overlapping 10-year periods, 1852-1900 
Year Relative  S.D. Adjusted relative  
  transport cost   transport cost 
1852-1860 9.8 4.2 11.0 
1856-1865 11.8 4.9 13.2 
1861-1870 11.3 5.0 12.6 
1866-1875 10.4 3.7 11.6 
1871-1880 11.7 3.5 12.6 
1876-1885 9.6 3.8 9.6 
1881-1890 7.6 3.0 7.6 
1886-1895 7.0 3.0 7.0 
1891-1900 7.5 2.9 7.5 
1896-1900 8.5 2.7 8.5 
Sources: See Appendix. Transport cost represented by New York to Liverpool freights between  1852-1877 and 
from New York to London thereafter. To obtain relative transport costs, transport costs are divided by price of 
wheat in New York. The column for adjusted rates  has been obtained by multiplying non-adjusted relative 
transport costs by 1.12 in 1852-1875. In 1871-1880 adjusted relative transport costs are the weighted sum of 
unadjusted and adjusted rates with a weight of 2/3 to adjusted and 1/3 to unadjusted.  Wheat qualities used as in 
Figure 2.  
 
                                                 
9
 If I had expressed relative transport cost  in terms of London price of wheat the recorded de-
cline  had been even lower since wheat price in London falls relative to price in New York. 
See Appendix  Table 1. 
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As noted at the outset the results presented here challenge a conventional wisdom suggesting 
sharp rather than modest decline. It also disputes the view of sustained decline during the 
second half of the 19th century. My data rather suggest a decline only in the last quarter of the 
century. To the extent that claims of sharp decline are inferred from  changes in price spreads 
of non-quality adjusted commodities they can easily be dismissed for reasons advanced above. 
But it is worth discussing other explicit estimates of freight rate decline. Of course there are 
major differences in number of routes and goods between my study and previous ones. What 
holds for a single good (wheat) on the New York-UK route might not hold for a basket of 
goods and a range of routes, coastal as well as long haul. Transatlantic wheat transport does 
not figure  in North’s and  Harley’s  and only marginally in Isserlis’ estimates. In principle the 
choice of deflator might matter. It might be that grain and transport costs were a couple falling 
relative to other prices in this period. However, I am inclined to take the view that the 
difference between my results and  Isserlis’ original data– which underlie much of modern 
transport cost research including Harley’s results for the period after 1870 - are more apparent 
than real. As noted earlier Harley expresses  Isserlis index  in a new unit, transport costs in 
constant prices  per ton of coal. A much reproduced Figure 1 from Harley’s  1988 JEH  
article10 conveys the impression of a sharp fall in real transport costs and has been interpreted 
by quite a few  as indicating a transport revolution a nd by a few as representative for Atlantic 
transport costs.11   My data suggest large variations in nominal and real freight rates. That fact 
implies that the choice of period can crucially affect results as any reader of Isserlis should 
know.  On closer scrutiny, Isserlis’ data do not support an interpretation of sharply falling real 
transport cost. Figures 3a-3c illustrate my point.  
                                                 
10
 C.Knick Harley, ‘Ocean Freight Rates and Productivity, 1740-1913:The Primacy of Me-
chanical Invention Reaffirmed’,Journal of Economic History,Vol.48,1988, pp. 851-875. 
11
 To present Harley’s results as indicative of Atlantic transport costs, as K.O’Rourke  and J.G 
Williamson do, is quite misleading. Atlantic routes are a small proportion of  Hartley’s as well 
as Isserlis’ samples of routes. See K.E.O’Rourke and J.G.Williamson, ‘When did globalization 
begin?’, European Review of Economic History, 6,1,2202,pp. 36-7. 
 
11 
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For those years when Isserlis’ and my data intersect, that is 1870-1900, Isserlis  results 
reinforce my argument that the decline is modest. Figure 3 a traces the ratio of his freight 
index to his wholesale price index  and suggests a stationary process along a slowly – but as 
we will soon learn not significant - declining trend. The relative fall in transport costs is a 
mere 10 per cent. Extending the period to 1936, see Figure 3 b, which is the last year for 
which Isserlis provided data confirms the result of a small relative long-run  decline in 
transport costs when we have excluded the outliers – freight rates rocketed  during and 
immediately after WW1. It is only when the time series is cut off  before WW1, see Figure 3 
c, that you get a notable decline  in freight costs relative to the wholesale price index, a  33  
per cent decline. However it is lower than the numbers usually derived from Isserlis’ data 
when combined with Harley’s and North’s  series for the pre 1870 period implying a 
substantial pre-1870 decline in freight rates. My data, displayed in Figure 2 and Table 1, do 
not confirm a sustained decline in freight rates  between the 1850s to the start of the Isserlis 
series in 1869/70. If anything there is an increase in real transport cost levels. How much 
confidence  you have in the analysis of Isserlis data for the 1870 to 1914 period depends on 
the interpretation of the spell of extremely low freight rates between 1902 and 1910, in fact the 
historic trough of the series. Figure 3 b shows, however, that prices revert to a value around 
0.9, which is the mean of the series,  well before the outbreak of  WW1. A sensibl e 
interpretation of the 1902-1910 experience is to see it as a transitory deviation – rather than 
permanent level change – and if so  it should not be  used for generalizations  regarding the  
19th century. That insight is supported by a formal analysis of the Isserlis price and freight 
indices. The falling trend – as noted above - in Figure 3 b is not significant.  However  
econometric error correction tests indicate that the ratio of freight rates  to prices is a strong 
mean reverting process with the mean  of the series at 0.9. This is – in itself a remarkable 
result given the inflated claims of long run  reductions in real transport costs. In the first 
simple error correction specification changes in the ratio was modelled  as dependent on the 
deviation of observed ratio to its mean 
∆(F/P)t = α[(F/P)t-1 - λ] + εt 
where F is freight rates,  P is the price level and λ  the sample mean. It turned out that the 
adjustment parameter α was negative, as expected, and significant. 
The other specification  explicitly models both price and freight cost adjustments to deviations 
from the sample mean. 
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∆Ft =  α1 [ (F/P)t-1  - λ ]  +  εt 
∆Pt  = α2 [ (F/P)t-1 -  λ ]  +  εt 
 
 The Isserlis data refer to UK price level and inward and outward (mostly) UK freights. 
Consider the domestic UK price level P as linked proportionally to the international price level 
as we know it was during the Gold Standard. Then an increase in F/P signifies a rise in freight 
rates relative to the international price level. That means that  UK c.i.f. export prices  rise 
relative to the international price level and UK c.i.f. import prices rise relative to P. As a 
consequence demand for both outward and inward freights will fall and the expected sign on 
α1 can  be expected to be negative. The adjustment  of  the  domestic price level  P is 
ambiguous, however. Falling export demand will depress prices while the increase in import 
prices will divert demand from imports to domestic substitutes and stimulate the domestic 
price level. Two forces operate with opposing signs. It turns out that  α1  is significant (t-value 
–2.45) and negative (-0.25 when the estimation is done in logs) suggesting a half life of a 
shock of a little more than 2 years) as expected while α2 is  not significantly different from 
zero. The estimation is performed on the entire period with with WW1  (1915-1921) dummies. 
The results make sense in that it is plausible that real freight rates adjust to deviations from its 
long run ratio while it is less  likely that the price level adjust to deviations in one of its 
constituent prices.  
The claim that real transport costs declined dramatically, say, in the order of  40 -70 per cent 
during the second half of the 19th century and up to WW1 is seriously challenged both by my 
new data and a rigorous analysis of  Isserlis’ original data. Paradoxically most of the alleged 
late 19th century decline is inferred from a few years of outlier rates in the first decade of the 
20th century. Since the analysis of segments of the Isserlis data yield widely different results 
my recommendation is to stick to the entire period which can meaningfully be represented as a 
mean reverting process.  
 
4. Port charges. 
It has not been possible - despite our best attempts - to produce a continuous time series either 
for marine insurance or port charges. We are interested in UK porterage charges throughout 
the period and for New York until 1878. After that date price in New York was quoted f.o.b. 
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There was no indication of dramatic changes in port charges over time in the data on Master 
Porter Rates in the archives of Merseyside Maritime Museum.12 These charge differed 
according to whether the grain was in bulk or in bags, whether ships were unloaded on quay or 
not, and whether quality and weights of the received grain were checked or not. There seems 
to have been considerable nominal rigidity in what were basically labour costs which means 
that port handling costs might actually have increased relative to the price of grain as the 
decline in grain prices sets in the 1880s.( The nominal price of US Red wheat negotiated in  
New York is shown in Appendix Figure 2).  
Here are some vital details of the composition of porterage charges.  Costs were divided by 
tasks such as landing on quay and trimming (4.75 to 5d per ton of grain); filling into 
merchant’s sacks and weighing (5.5d per ton); removing from scales and loading of or re-
stowing (2.5d per ton).  These items add to a total of about 1s 1d per ton.  The cost of 
‘receiving from ship, stowing on quay or in barges and duly protected and delivery to cart, 
railway truck or barge’ varied according to time of delivery:  1 s 2 d per ton if delivered within 
7 days; 2s if delivered within 14 days; and 2s 4d if delivered within 21 days. 
These charges included insurance and sack hire, but not the ‘usual working out from ship’, 
which apparently was the shipper’s job.  An extra ½d to 2d per ton is quoted as the Master 
Porter’s rate if they had to do it. 
Discharging in bags in London was slightly cheaper in 1872 (8d) than in 1879 at (10d).   
If grain was in warehouses there were of course additional costs of discharging and delivery. 
The storehouse rent was around 2d per week but discharging and delivery rates were quite 
high at 2s 6d per ton. Such details could be magnified, but in the end if we try to work out a 
typical port handling cost from these data we would land at a maximum of 8d (including 
storage) and a minimum of 3d per quarter. Assuming these charges to be fairly rigid 
downwards they will increase in proportional terms as price of wheat declines. I will estimate 
the charges as one percent of wheat price increasing to one and half per cent. For New York 
charges are estimated to one per cent until 1878. 
 
5. Marine insurance. 
                                                 
12
 See Revisions of Master Porter Rates, in Worked up papers, Merseyside Maritime Museum, 
vol. 66:1879 and Dock and Port Charges of Great Britain and Ireland, London 1881 
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Insurance premiums are very difficult to document since most records seem to have perished.  
It is impossible to establish anything like a time series. The Guildhall Library in London 
which houses the archives of many maritime insurance companies such as Lloyds, Royal 
Exchange Assurance, London Assurance, and Indemnity Marine Assurance holds hardly any 
documents on insurance rates, except for a few in the Commercial Union Assurance Company 
dossier. The few documents available give a detailed picture for a single year, 1863, as 
described in Table 1 below. However it can be safely assumed that although rates declined the 
decline was from a low level. 
 
Table 2 Insurance rates (cash premium as a percentage of value of goods insured) for 
various transport routes 1863.  Per cent. 
UK ports to East Indies 1.4  East Indies to UK ports 2.6 
UK ports to Australasia 1.52  Australasia to UK ports 1.19 
UK ports to West Indies 2.0  West Indies to UK ports 2.53 
UK ports to South America 0.61  South America to UK ports 1.65 
UK ports to Mediterranean 0.44  Mediterranean to UK ports 0.73 
UK ports to Spain & Portugal 0.2  Spain &Portugal to UK ports 0.37 
UK ports to North Sea 0.24  North Sea to UK ports 0.45 
UK ports to Holland&Belgium 0.18  Holland&Belgium to UK ports 0.23 
UK ports  to France and vice versa 0.14    
UK to Baltic 1.2  Baltic to UK ports 0.7 
UK ports to British America 1.1  British America to UK 2.18 
UK ports to US 0.96  US to UK ports 1.69 
 New York to UK ports, grain 2.49 
 
 excluding December -February 1.71 
16 
 
Sources: Commercial union assurance company, MS 23697 and MS 23698, Guildhall Library, 
London. 
 
Table 2 shows, not surprisingly, a link between the length of passage and insurance rates - 
although the South American routes do not fit neatly into the picture- and in all but two cases 
outward rates are lower than inward rates. That fact probably reflects an additional agency cost 
faced by London-based insurance companies when insuring voyages from foreign ports since 
the assessment of risk was left to corresponding agents. However the incidence of waste and 
hence insurance risk are to some extent goods specific, and goods composition differed 
systematically between outward and inward transports. That might explain the two exceptions.  
Insurance rates also varied over the year, peaking in winter when the incidence of casualties 
was highest.  On average the summer rates were about two-thirds of winter rates for Lloyds in 
1853-72.13    
Individual rates differed reflecting the quality of ships and shipper. In the data on which Table 
1 is based the highest rate for grain was 7 per cent and the lowest 0.7 per cent but it is to be 
expected that as sail was replaced by steam and wooden vessels by iron risks and rates 
declined. By the early 1920s insurance rates for transatlantic grain were down to about 1 per 
cent of value, so all in all a decline from say around 1.75 per cent to 1.25 per cent seems 
plausible over the 1850-1900 period.10 
 
6. Determining the relative impact of transport costs and market efficiency in the closing 
of the transatlantic price gap. 
Let us now, finally, try to determine the extent of the London-New York price differential and 
its evolution. Due to the lack of strictly comparable qualities the analysis is restricted to a 
number of periods between 1855 and 1900 - rather than the entire period. The qualities used in 
the analysis are Red Western in New York and American Red in London for 1855-1864 and 
Red Winter in both markets for 1878-1900. The results are presented in Table 3. 
In column 1 the difference between the London price and the New York price is shown as a 
percentage of the New York price. Column 2 documents the transport cost from New York to 
                                                 
13
 F.Martin, The history of Lloyds and of marine insurance in Great Britain, London: 
Macmillan, 1876, p 399. 
10
‘Price spreads and shipment costs in the wheat export trade of Canada’ in Wheat Studies, 
Vol.2, No.5, 1926, pp.177-202. 
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UK ports as a percentage of New York wheat price. Column 3, finally, is the residual, which is 
column 1 minus column 2 minus marine insurance fees and port charges estimated to 3.75 per 
cent 1855-64 and 2.75 per cent thereafter, expressed in terms of New York price. As discussed 
in sections 5 and 6 porterage charges probably increased a little in proportional terms, while 
insurance decreased.  
 
Table 3. London – New York wheat price differential, relative transport cost and 
residual differential. 1855 – 1900. Per cent.  
Year Price S.D. Relative transport S.D. Residual 
  differential   cost     
1855-1858 22.0 10.5 9.9 3.1 8.4 
1855-1864 26.5 13.7 13.4 4.7 9.3 
1878-1900 15.2 6.2 8.1 3.3 4.4 
1892-1900 13.9 5.5 7.6 2.8 3.5 
Sources: See appendix. London - New York wheat price differential is American Red in 
London relative to Red Western in New York 1855-1858 and 1860-1864. In 1878-1888 and 
1892-1900 the price differential is US Red Winter in London (Glasgow 1895-1900) and Red 
Winter in New York. Relative transport costs in 1855-64 have been adjusted as in Table 1. 
The residual is the price differential minus the relative transport cost minus 3.75 per cent 
insurance and port handling costs in 1855-64 and 2.75 per cent thereafter.  
 
 
The table can be summarized as follows. The top and bottom rows show the first and last 
period under scrutiny and reveal a decline in the price differential of  8.1 percentage points of 
which 28 per cent  can be accounted for by decline in freight rates. Both these periods 
constitute sub-periods in longer periods, 1855-1864 and 1878-1900, respectively, but both the 
longer periods have a couple of years of market inactivity around 1859 and 1890-1, 
respectively. A comparison of the two longer periods, 1855-64 and 1878-1900, does indicate a 
larger relative impact of the fall in transport costs, around 49 per cent. However the impact is 
probably not representative because the period 1855-64 contains a few years with 
exceptionally high transport cost.   As pointed out in section 3  Isserlis’ data  also suggest a 
modest decline in real freight rates, in fact less than half  of  the decline I report for the years 
when we can compare results. The error correction analysis also strongly warns against using 
segments of the long series as a basis for  strong conclusions.A balanced assessment  of the 
decline would therefore  lie between 20-30 per cent . Be as it may, it is clear that the residual  
is more than halved while the proportional decline in transport costs is much smaller.  
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To sum up: there is a role of transport cost reductions in price convergence but it is not the 
main factor.  Improved market performance and marketing efficiency are more important. 
However, market inefficiencies were not entirely phased out with the residual remaining at 3.5 
per cent.   It is possible that the residual includes some un-identified costs, such as traders’ 
commission, but these charges were probably not (much) higher than one per cent. Even had 
the residual been reduced to zero the sum of transport costs, marine insurance, and porterage 
charges would not have permitted price differences to be below ten per cent:  down from mid-
century but still big enough to matter. 
 
7.Conclusion. 
Previous research on price spreads and transport costs has exaggerated the scope of price 
convergence and the role of transport costs reduction therein. Transport costs fell but the fall 
sets in only in the last quarter of the  19th century. Transport costs and other transaction costs 
remained high and continued to give European peasants and landowners an implicit protection 
in the order of  around 15 per cent , down by at most 10 percentage points. European farmers 
were affected by the general fall in producer’s price, though. It is important to point out that 
Chicago prices fell, although the decline is less pronounced than the fall in New York. 
Appendix figure 3 indicates that Chicago Spring No 2 declined from a price of a little more 
than US$ 1 per bushel in the 1870s to a all time low low in the early 1890s of 60 cents. That 
decline is larger than the fall in transatlantic freight rates. 
The main emphasis in this article is on market efficiency, as measured by a  residual price 
differential, as a major contributor to price convergence. By neglecting improvements in 
market performance you risk neglecting a - in fact the –single most important factor in the 
process of market integration.  
But how can we be so sure that the fall in the residual actually reveals increased market 
efficiency? Here is the answer. The residual is a measure of the price differential that cannot 
be accounted for by recorded costs. It therefore represents unexploited gains from trade, 
barriers to entry and inefficient marketing practices made possible by the lack of transparency. 
There are good reasons for risk-averse traders to ignore gains from trade in a market where 
information flowed at about the same speed as goods. That means that it took about a month 
for a London trader to know what the New York market made of the news from London. The 
telegraph transmitted information by the hour and the print media diffused it within 24 hours. 
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It should be obvious that gains from trade were more easily understood, known, and acted 
upon in the new information culture of the 1870s and onwards. This interpretation is supported 
by evidence on national markets: a recent study of grain markets in nineteenth century France 
found that almost the entire increase in the speed of adjustment to the transport cost adjusted 
law of one price took place between the 1825-35 and 1855-65. While the speed of transporting 
goods changed little, what differed between the periods was the information system. In 1855-
65 all major French markets were linked telegraphically.11 When inventory adjustments are 
possible what drives price adjustment will be new information rather than the arrival of new 
deliveries.  
Traditional analysis of market integration has focused too much on price convergence, often 
identifying market integration with reduction in price gaps. However integrated markets need 
not - often cannot - obey to the law of one price in the literal sense of the word. The relevant 
standard for the extent of market integration is the transport and transaction costs adjusted 
law of one price. Markets can be well integrated leaving considerable price differentials 
reflecting transport and other trading costs. The real issue is the stability of the transport and 
transaction cost adjusted law of one price and the speed of adjustment back to that equilibrium 
after a shock. For example, in the last decades of the nineteenth century the half-life of a shock 
to the Paris and New York price differential equilibrium was only a fraction of the time it took 
goods to be transported from New York to Paris. 
It is certainly not by accident that the entire dataset used for this study is collected from 
newspapers relying first on postal communication for news and later on telegraph-transmitted 
data. Whatever impact transport technology had in stimulating market integration it is now 
time to give the profound changes in 19th century information technology the role they 
deserve. 
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Appendix 
A new data set based on the reported transactions from commodity markets in New York, 
London, and Liverpool and a few other markets in Britain has been compiled. The main 
sources are general newspapers like The (London) Times and New York Times and specialized 
commercial journals like Beerbohm’s Evening Corn Trade List. The  (London) Times report on 
a weekly basis from Monday market at Mark Lane in London while New York Times and 
Beerbohm’s report transactions from New York and a number of continental ports as well as 
London and a number of UK markets such as Glasgow and Liverpool. While the New York 
dataset just contains US varieties the London series have a large number of foreign and 
domestic wheat sorts. On that basis the data represent identical qualities traded the same day in 
New York, London, and Liverpool. Before 1855 and during a short spell in the mid 1860s, and 
early 1890s trading activities did not always permit us to find exactly matching days. However 
reported data represent at most a discrepancy of three to four market days. Grain trade becomes 
erratic in the mid 1860s and when in resumes in the end of that decade there are still difficulties 
finding comparable and identical qualities. It is not until 1878 that we have a continuous, 
frequent and perfectly matching pair of qualities in New York and UK, Red Winter. Some 
caution should therefore be applied when interpreting the late 1860s and early 1870s. 
 
Sources 
Wheat spot prices in New York, 1850-1900. 
1850-53, from New York Journal of Commerce. Prices refer to Prime white Genesee at 
Monday market. In 1850 quoted price is the average of maximum and minimum price current. 
From 1851 it is the spot price. Prices in original are dollars per bushel. Prices read from 
microfilm made from an original in poor condition. New York Public Library and selected US 
research libraries.  
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1854-1877, from New York Times (widely available on microfilm). Prices refer to Monday 
market or a market day close to Monday market: for example, the Saturday market of the 
previous week or some other market day in the week of the Monday date. Several varieties 
(e.g. Red Southern, White Southern, Red Western, White Western, Red and Amber ) ceased to 
be quoted from the early 1860s on. From then on only Red Western and White Western were 
quoted often enough to be useful. The price in the original source was quoted in dollars per 
bushel.  
1878-1900, from Beerbohm’s Evening Corn Trade List. Price refers to Red Winter in New 
York at Monday market. Dollars per bushel, transformed to shillings per quarter. Beerbohm’s 
is available in hard copy at the British Library’s newspaper branch at Colindale, North London. 
 
Transport prices from New York to Liverpool, London and other ports 1852-1900. 
Data from sources as for New York wheat, except that 1878 transport prices stem from the 
New York Times. Prices in original are in pence per bushel. In most cases prices refer to so 
called berth rates for transports to London and Liverpool. Berth rates were offered by liners 
loading grain as well as other goods. These were often slightly cheaper than chartered freights 
because loads had to be discharged immediately after arrival.  
 
Wheat spot prices in London 1852-1900. 
1852- 1877:  The Times. Prices refer to Monday market at Mark Lane. For British wheat Essex 
and Kent White, Essex and Kent Red. For US wheat American Red and American white. From 
1868 to 1877 only one ‘American’ quality is quoted. 
1878-1900:  Beerbohm’s Evening Corn Trade List. British wheat: Mark Lane Monday market: 
English White and English Red. The New York quality quoted in London is Red winter The 
London price of US Red Winter is lacking from 1895 to 1900. The Glasg ow quotation has 
been used instead. 
 
Conversion conventions  
All prices have been expressed in monetary units and measures used in UK, that is shillings per 
imperial quarter with one imperial quarter being equal to eight imperial bushels of 0.03637 
cubic metres. The bushel quoted in New York is assumed to be the US bushel, also called the 
Winchester bushel, at 0.03524 cubic metres. Transport costs are an exception: in the US and 
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UK sources transports from New York are quoted in UK pence per bushel. That bushel has 
been assumed to be the imperial bushel.  
In a few cases in the 1870s the price of transport is quoted in pence per a stated amount of lbs. 
Prices are converted to pence per bushel assuming one imperial bushel being 62 lbs. 
Dollar prices in New York are converted to shillings by using the monthly exchange rates in 
New York for pound sterling at the 60 days bill of exchange rate. First week of a month quotes 
the exchange rate as the average of that month and the preceding month. Last week of the 
month quotes exchange rate as the average of that month and the next. The source used is 
J.Schneider et al. (eds), Währungen der Welt I, Europäische and Nordamerikanische 
Devisenkurse 1777- 1914, Vol 1, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1991.  
 
 
Appendix table 1. Average relative transport cost in overlapping 10-year periods, 1852-
1900. Freight rates from New York to UK in per cent of price of US wheat in London. 
Year Relative  S.D. 
  transport cost   
1852-1860 8.0 3.1 
1856-1865 9.0 3.2 
1861-1870 9.3 3.3 
1866-1875 10.2 3.2 
1871-1880 10.5 2.8 
1876-1885 8.1 2.9 
1881-1890 6.7 2.3 
1886-1895 6.1 2.3 
1891-1900 6.7 2.4 
1896-1900 7.6 2.2 
Sources: See Appendix. Relative transport cost estimated as in Figure 2, that is Liverpool freight rates have not 
been adjusted by a factor  1.12. 
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